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Working Paper
Draft: NCF/11 Jan. 78

MEMORANDUM FOR: D/DCI/NIFE

FROM : Director CIRIS Staff

SUBJECT : Sharing CIRIS Data within the Intelligence Community

1. Both DASD(I) and CIA/OPPB have requested broader sharing of CIRIS data, and I understand that State/INR generally agrees with the DASD(I) view. A DASD(I) memorandum on this subject is attached.

2. The purpose of this memorandum is to identify briefly the kinds of data outputs that CIRIS can provide and to suggest possible general rules for data sharing among intelligence managers.

The CIRIS Structure

3. The present CIRIS outputs contain three types of information:

(a) Melded Statistics. These identify the intelligence resources against a subject or a geographic target, or by a sensor system, or by the type of resources involved (e.g., R&D dollars, type of manpower, etc.). These statistics do not identify any specific units, activities, components or other organizational entities. They may identify a Community total, or a Program total, or an Agency or Service total, depending on the question asked.

(b) Indexed Statistics. These present the same kind of information as the Melded Statistics, except that they add organizational identifications of the specific entities which have reported that some of their resources are involved in the specified problem. The Indexed Statistics do not present a total spread of the resources of each of the entities, but only identify that portion of an entity's total resources that has been designated as related to the specified problem.

(c) Full Resources Data on Each Reporting Entity. The CIRIS Entity Status Reports display -- entity by entity -- the total resources of each entity and the manner in which those resources of dollars and manpower are reported by the Program Manager as being subdivided into the CIRIS functions and targets. The Entity Status Report is the basic input to CIRIS and all CIRIS statistical displays are developed from this source. Anyone with access to all of this data can independently recreate any CIRIS display or further manipulate the data in whatever ways he wishes.

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4. The foregoing three types of data have been aggregated at several levels, as follows:

(a) Community Statistics. This includes the total of CIA, State/INR, and all of the DOD programs.

(b) Consolidated Defense Statistics. This aggregation includes the major Defense intelligence programs consolidated into CDIP-combined totals.

(c) Individual Intelligence Programs or Activities. At this level of aggregation, the following individual programs or activities can be shown separately (each Program containing the same three types of data as identified in paragraph 2 above):

The CIA Program (less Covert Action).

The State/INR Program.

The Consolidated Cryptologic Program.

The General Defense Intelligence Program.

[Redacted]

Army, Navy and Air Force. By machine manipulations, the Service "slices" of intelligence resources within a major intelligence program or across program lines can be aggregated.

Other DOD intelligence activities in Program 3. This includes separate identification of the [Redacted] and Advanced Program Support, and two or three other smaller activities which are not now absorbed within any of the foregoing, major DOD intelligence programs.

[Redacted]

Possible Rules for CIRIS Data Sharing

5. The problem of data sharing should be considered in two contexts: (a) assuming some data are to be shared, who might be the authorized participants in such data sharing; and (b) what data might be shared? The

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following discussion is directed only to the second question, and the discussion proceeds by commenting on several separate problems for which special rules are suggested. Two new terms are introduced in this discussion. as follows:

(a) Standard CIRIS Dissemination. This means that the DCI's CIRIS Staff, which maintains the CIRIS community data base under the custodianship of the NIRB, is authorized and directed to provide certain CIRIS data on a routine and recurring basis and without the need for a special approval for dissemination as authorized by the NIRB on a case by case basis.

(b) Specifically Authorized CIRIS Dissemination. This means that the DCI's CIRIS Staff is authorized to make available certain specified CIRIS data in accordance with the terms of prior approval which has been granted by the NIRB in response to an ad hoc request.

The remainder of this discussion deals with special considerations that may be deemed to affect certain portions of the total CIRIS data base.

6. Full Resources Data on Each Reporting Entity. This concerns the third type of CIRIS data, identified in paragraph 2 above. The CIRIS Entity Status Reports contain the total detail submitted by each organizational component participating in the CIRIS system. A suggested general rule for this type of data is as follows:

The full Entity Status Report data will be provided automatically, i.e., by standard CIRIS dissemination, only to the Program Manager within whose program the Entity falls, except that (1) Entity Status Report data for all DOD programs will also be provided to DASD(I) for its own use and for such further dissemination, if any, as DASD(I) may direct; and (2) full Entity Status Report data will also be provided to the DCI's CIRIS Staff solely for its own use and not for further dissemination.

The suggested rule is compatible with the treatment directed by the CIA Executive Director/Comptroller in a recent Agency internal regulation governing the handling within the Agency of CIA component data on their resources.

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7. Treatment of HUMINT Resources. In response to a request for the creation of a USIB committee on HUMINT, the DCI has directed the appointment of a special, ad hoc, interagency committee to study this matter and to develop further insights on the community's HUMINT activities. This committee is now functioning, supported administratively by DCI/NIPE and reporting to D/DCI/NIPE. Its efforts to date have drawn upon the terminology being developed in the CIRIS System to describe functions and targets related to HUMINT, and it is anticipated that the insights that will be developed through this committee will make possible improvements in the present CIRIS structure with respect to the identification and display of HUMINT resources. Pending the completion of this committee's work, which may take several months, the following temporary general rule is suggested:

GDIP data on HUMINT Collection will be provided automatically, i.e., by standard CIRIS dissemination, to the GDIP Program Manager and to DASD(I). CIA data on HUMINT Collection will be provided automatically to the CIA Program Manager. Both GDIP and CIA data will be provided as a normal input to the DCI's CIRIS Staff solely for its own use and not for further dissemination.

The foregoing temporary general rule is to be reconsidered by the NIRB no later than six months from the date of this memorandum, and this rule will be confirmed or modified at that time.

8. Treatment of Counterintelligence and Investigative Activities Resources. To a not inconsiderable degree, Counterintelligence and HUMINT collection activities may be found to interlock, particularly in the CIA. Considerable public and Congressional interest is currently being displayed with respect to military counterintelligence activities, and this subject has become a particularly sensitive one at the present time. In recognition of these two circumstances, the following temporary general rule is suggested:

GDIP data on Counterintelligence and Investigative Activities resources will be provided automatically, i.e., by standard CIRIS dissemination, to the GDIP Program Manager and to DASD(I). CIA data on Counterintelligence and Investigative Activities resources will be provided automatically to the CIA Program Manager. Both GDIP and CIA data will be provided to the DCI's CIRIS staff solely for its own use and not for further dissemination.

The foregoing temporary general rule is to be reconsidered by the NIRB no later than six months from the date of this memorandum, and this rule will be confirmed or modified at that time.

9. Treatment of Resources Data on Technical Sensors. This includes the Collection and Processing of Imagery, COMINT, ELINT, Telemetry, RADINT, ACOUSTINT, Atomic Energy Detection sensors, [redacted] the following considerations apply: (a) At the highest level, Imagery collection and processing is carried on jointly between Defense and CIA components;

[redacted] to other sensors; (c) the other technical sensors listed above involve activities that are conducted for the most part by both Defense and CIA collectors and processors, and there already exists a considerable degree of interchange at the working levels regarding these sensors. In recognition of these circumstances, the following general rule is suggested:

Melded statistics and Indexed statistics on technical sensors (i.e., Imagery, COMINT, ELINT, Telemetry, RADINT, ACOUSTINT, Atomic Energy Detection sensors, [redacted]), regardless of the intelligence program from which the data are derived, may be shared by those designated to receive Standard CIRIS Dissemination.

(# - This memorandum does not address the question of who are to be so designated.)

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10. Treatment of Resources Data on Positive Intelligence Production.

The Production function is one in which information from many sensors and sources are drawn upon to produce a variety of intelligence end products. The Production function is presently carried out in the Defense/ODIP and in the State and CIA programs. The output of the Production function provides a principal guideline for reflecting the interests and needs of users and consumers of intelligence both within and outside of the intelligence community. Feedback from the Production function to collectors and processors can provide important insights for future collection and processing efforts. In this light, information about intelligence Production is useful to the managers of all intelligence programs. The following general rule is suggested:

Melded statistics and Indexed statistics on intelligence Production, regardless of the intelligence program from which the data are derived, may be shared by those designated to receive Standard CIRIS Dissemination.

(# - This memorandum does not address the question of who are to be so designated.)

11. Treatment of Resources Data on Communications Security. Communications Security is a function assigned within the Consolidated Cryptologic Program managed by the Director NSA. It is a specialized subject and one with considerable sensitivity. In this light, the following general rule is suggested:

CCP data on Communications Security resources will be provided automatically to the CCP Program Manager and to DASD(I). This will also be provided to the DCI's CIRIS Staff solely for its own use and not for further dissemination.

12. CIRIS Data not specified in paragraphs 6 through 11 above. Except as provided in paragraphs 6-11 above, CIRIS data will be given Standard CIRIS Dissemination to those designated to receive this material.

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13. Special Cases. Notwithstanding the provisions of the foregoing paragraphs limiting the general dissemination of certain CIRIS data, any NIRB member may request at any time that CIRIS data bearing on a particular problem be supplied on a need to know basis and under specified conditions. The NIRB will take prompt and appropriate action on any such request.

14. Release of CDIP Data by DASD(I). DASD(I), as the higher level authority over Defense intelligence programs, can be expected to make additional rules for sharing within the DOD the CIRIS information on the CDIP and its component programs. Within the CDIP, these provisions promulgated by DASD(I) may be either more or less restrictive than those set forth above in paragraphs 6 through 11. DASD(I) should keep the DCI's CIRIS Staff advised on any such rules in order to insure appropriately coordinated understanding concerning CIRIS data releases.

15. Statutes, Executive Orders, Presidential and National Security Council Directives. This memorandum is not intended to affect the interpretations now accorded to existing statutes, Executive Orders, and Presidential or National Security Council directives that concern intelligence organizations and activities, and the provisions of this memorandum are intended to be construed in a manner consistent therewith.

16. Security Considerations. This memorandum is not intended to authorize access to classified or compartmented information that may be within the CIRIS System. Such access is based upon the granting of appropriate clearances through the prescribed channels of administration and command and on the application of the need to know principle. Likewise, this memorandum does not deal with the security aspects of the transmission or the storage of CIRIS data, both of which are to be accomplished by conforming to standards prescribed by cognizant security and command authorities.

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